2022-06-20 07:54:06
Williamson County, Tennessee - EAC Report - Part 1
The report is for the municipal election held on October 26, 2021 and can be found on the EAC website here.
Doug Logan does an excellent job of reviewing this report in this video.
There are striking parallels between this report, Halderman's Antrim County report and what happened in Dekalb County, GA.
Here are quotes from the official EAC report followed by our comments:
> Close poll reports from 7 of the 18 ICP tabulators used during the election did not match the number of ballots scanned
The same thing happened in Dekalb County.
How is it possible that the problem only occurs on
some tabulators and not
all of them?
Why weren't ALL the tabulators updated with the latest configuration files? This is starting to become a trend, almost as if it is intentional... And it is starting to make a lot of sense:
- Mixing good tabulators with bad tabulators makes discovering the error (cough... manipulation) harder
- Before each election cycle a few more tabulators can be "fixed" to gradually change the voting patterns within a county so no one notices.
- Most importantly, they can always blame "human error" and provide a "possible deniable" explanation.
> The central count tabulation was confirmed via hand count of the paper ballot records
If we keep falling back on hand counting to double check the tabulators, why are we using the tabulators at all?
They keep tacitly confirming that hand counting is the most reliable counting method.
> It was discovered that the system was installed with outdated versions of two configuration files when the system was upgraded from D-Suite 5.5 to D-Suite 5.5-B in January of 2021
The version of the configuration files seems to be a major problem in Antrim and Dekalb as well.
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he ballot paper should clearly display (and encode) the version of the configuration files. The tabulator would then check the version on the ballot matches its own internal version before analyzing the ballot image.
The CVR files should also contain the configuration version used by the tabulator, so that when the data is uploaded to the EMS, a check can be made to ensure the version of the configuration files used in the tabulator match the version used in the EMS. (This would have completely prevented the Antrim County miscount).
This is really basic "checks" that are trivial to implement. The fact that Dominion does not perform these checks borders on
professional negligence (to put it mildly).
It's pretty obvious why these checks are not performed. We will let you guess why.
> This election definition was imported into the D-Suite 5.5-B system from a definition originally created on the D-Suite 5.5 system.
Think about this for second in terms of timeline. The county is right in the middle of preparing for an election.
Do you really think it makes sense that a county would upgrade their election software when they are right in the middle of preparing for an election?
Regardless, why doesn't Dominion make election definition files produced by an older version of the software incompatible with a newer version, if that is truly the case? Again, that would be trivial to implement.
> Results showed that the anomaly was recreated on each of
the ICP scanners.
This clearly indicates some tabulators were updated with the new configuration files and others were NOT. Why?
How is it possible to miss some tabulators? (i.e. 11 were missed out of 18).
You only have ONE job to do... and you still can't get it right? ... Or is it intentional?
> indicating a QR code misread occurred.
Doug goes into this in great detail in his video. You can't misread a QR code. Either you can read it in full or you can not read it at all. There is no middle ground.
(Cont'd in part 2)
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