Qubes OS📢

2021-08-31 16:40:43 [3] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021.txt


Letter from the Qubes security team

The original letter and its detached signature files are available here:


canary-028-2021-letter-qst.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021-letter-qst.txt)
canary-028-2021-letter-qst.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021-letter-qst.txt.sig.marmarek)
canary-028-2021-letter-qst.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021-letter-qst.txt.sig.simon)


2021-08-31

Dear Qubes community,

As you can see in Qubes Canary 028 [1], Joanna has requested that she be
removed from the list of canary signers [2], and we have agreed to this
request. A careful reader might recall that, when Joanna left the Qubes
security team in 2018, we wrote [3]:

| However, due to the nature of PGP keys, there is no way to
| guarantee that Joanna will not retain a copy of the QMSK after
| transferring ownership to Marek. Since anyone in possession of the
| QMSK is a potential attack vector against the project, Joanna will
| continue to sign Qubes Canaries in perpetuity.

So, why this change now? It's still true that we (except Joanna herself,
of course) can't guarantee that Joanna did not really retain any copies
of the private portion of the Qubes Master Signing Key. Continuing to
have her sign the canaries on time every few months seemed like a
harmless commitment back then but turned out to require quite a lot of
effort now that Joanna is no longer involved in the project's day-to-day
business. Therefore, we reevaluated whether this is worth the effort
and decided against it. If Joanna were lying about deleting all her
copies of the private portion of the Qubes Master Signing Key, it is
equally possible that she could lie when signing a canary. Therefore,
we do not believe that her ceasing to sign canaries constitutes a
security problem.

This is a good reminder that canaries help only in a very specific
scenario, namely if someone (1) wants to act honestly, (2) is prevented
from stating that a compromise has occurred, and (3) is not forced to
state that no compromise has occurred. For example, this canary scheme
is designed to help if we were ever served with a government warrant
with an attached gag order that prohibited us from discussing the
warrant (the second condition) but that did not compel us to continue
signing and publishing canaries against our will (the third condition).
However, this will not work if the adversary is willing to coerce us
into signing and publishing statements or if signers are willing to lie
by signing statements they know to be false. Hence, this canary scheme
is limited and fallible, which is why we have always included a
statement to this effect in every canary.

Regards,
The Qubes security team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

[1] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021.txt
[2] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021-letter-joanna.txt
[3] https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/11/05/qubes-security-team-update/ Open / Comment

2021-08-31 16:40:43 Afghanistan Disaster: Debacle in Kabul Could Overshadow Biden's Presidency
The End of the German Airlift: What Will Become of the Afghans Left Behind?
Terror Expert on Afghanistan: "The Real Threat Is Islamic State, not Al-Qaida"
Redistributing Mafia Assets: The Palaces and Ruins of the Drug Bosses

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Afghanistan Live Updates: The U.S. Occupation Is Over, Ending America’s Longest War
U.S. Conducts Drone Strike in Kabul and Winds Down Airlift as Deadline Nears
Colombia’s Troubles Put a President’s Legacy on the Line
North Korea Restarted Plutonium-Producing Reactor, U.N. Agency Warns
How 2 Afghan Paralympians Defied the Odds to Get From Kabul to Tokyo

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Afghanistan: US investigates civilian deaths in Kabul strike
Hurricane Ida: One million people in Louisiana without power
Covid: EU recommends new travel restrictions for US as cases rise
Brazil bank robbers tie hostages to getaway cars in Araçatuba
China cuts children's online gaming to one hour

Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000059580872127a33754c4f4fb4e251ace298fea01ee73ca

Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!

[3] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/canaries


Letter from Joanna Rutkowska

The original letter and its detached signature file are available here:


canary-028-2021-letter-joanna.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021-letter-joanna.txt)
canary-028-2021-letter-joanna.txt.sig.joanna (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021-letter-joanna.txt.sig.joanna)


2021-08-31

Hello again, Qubes community!

I hope you've all been well. As many of you know, I've continued to sign
Qubes canaries [1] ever since I left the project [2]. At the time, I
thought I could just continue to sign them forever, but I didn't
consider that this would effectively make my secure Qubes laptop like a
ball-and-chain that I'd have to bring with me wherever I go. :)

At this point in my life, I'd really like to do much more traveling
while being able to pack light and feel free of too many physical
possessions. Since I am not willing to compromise the security of the
Qubes OS Project or the security of the Qubes laptop I've been using to
sign canaries in any way just to make my own personal life easier, I've
decided it would be best to request that I be removed from the list of
canary signers. Otherwise, there would be canaries that I wouldn't be
able to sign on-time, which would create headaches for Marek and Simon,
as well as confusion for users looking for my signature and not finding
it.

So, I've requested that the current Qubes security team remove me from
the Qubes canary signing process. And, FWIW, I confirm that I --
according to the best of my knowledge -- destroyed all copies of the
Qubes Master Signing Key which were in my possession when I passed
project lead to Marek, and no one has approached me in an attempt to
subvert the Qubes OS Project in any way. This request is solely for my
own personal reasons, as explained above.

Canary 028 [3] should contain a description of this event under the
"Special announcements" section, and that canary should be accompanied
by my signature as well as those of the current Qubes security team,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki and Simon Gaiser. Canary 028 is the final
canary I will sign.

I wish the Qubes OS Project continued success!

Sincerely,
Joanna

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/10/25/the-next-chapter/ Open / Comment

2021-08-31 16:40:43 Qubes Canary 028
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/08/31/canary-028/

We have published Qubes Canary 028. The text of this canary is
reproduced below. Please note that this canary contains an announcement
and is accompanied by two letters, which are also reproduced below.

General information

This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary 028 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-028-2021.txt

Learn how to obtain and authenticate the qubes-secpack and all the
signatures it contains:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

View all past canaries:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/

Qubes Canary 028


---===[ Qubes Canary 028 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1] state
the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is August 31, 2021.

2. There have been 70 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2021. Special note should be taken if no
new canary is published by that time or if the list of statements
changes without plausible explanation.

Special announcements
----------------------

Joanna Rutkowska will soon begin traveling without her Qubes laptop for
extended periods of time, which means she will not be able to sign
future canaries on time. She has asked the members of the Qubes security
team, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki and Simon Gaiser, to be released of her
obligation to sign canaries, and she has reaffirmed that she destroyed
all copies of the Qubes Master Signing Key in her possession when she
transferred the project lead position to Marek. The Qubes security team
has agreed to her request. Therefore, this will be the last Qubes canary
signed by Joanna.

Note that this canary is being published one day ahead of schedule
because this is the last day Joanna is available to sign. In addition to
the usual detached signatures from all three aforementioned individuals,
this canary is also accompanied by letters (with their own detached
signatures), all of which can be found in the canary directory in the
qubes-secpack [3].

Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.

Proof of freshness
-------------------

Tue, 31 Aug 2021 00:03:05 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Afghan Vice President in Letter to DER SPIEGEL: "A Deal for Surrender Won't Happen" Open / Comment

2021-08-25 20:10:54 Xen Summit Highlights: Xen FuSa SIG updates
https://xenproject.org/2021/08/25/xen-summit-highlights-xen-fusa-sig-updates/

During the 2021 Xen Summit, representatives from the Xen Project Functional Safety Special Interest Group have an update on what the SIG has been up to. The panelists covered what... Open / Comment

2021-08-25 17:59:49 | the new status tracking table can be accessed through.
|
| For 32-bit guests on x86, translation of requests has to occur because
| the interface structure layouts commonly differ between 32- and 64-bit.
|
| The translation of the request to obtain the frame numbers of the
| grant status table involves translating the resulting array of frame
| numbers. Since the space used to carry out the translation is limited,
| the translation layer tells the core function the capacity of the array
| within translation space. Unfortunately the core function then only
| enforces array bounds to be below 8 times the specified value, and would
| write past the available space if enough frame numbers needed storing.
|
| Malicious or buggy guest kernels may be able to mount a Denial of
| Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system. Privilege escalation
| and information leaks cannot be ruled out.


Impact
=======

XSA-378:

As the Xen Security Team explains, "The precise impact is system
specific, but can - on affected systems - be any or all of privilege
escalation, denial of service, or information leaks." Only a guest
with a PCI device can leverage this vulnerability, such as sys-net
or sys-usb in a default Qubes OS configuration.

XSA-379:

As the Xen Security Team explains, "A malicious guest may be able to
elevate its privileges to that of the host, cause host or guest Denial
of Service (DoS), or cause information leaks."

XSA-382:

Similar to the XSA-379. XSA-382 affects only Xen version 4.10 or newer,
thus only Qubes OS R4.1 is affected.


Discussion
===========

This is yet another set of problems related to grant tables v2. Since
none of the software included in Qubes OS uses this feature (both Linux
and Windows use grant tables v1), we have decided to disable grant
tables v2 in Xen globally in addition to apply the specific patches
described above.


Credits
========

See the original Security Advisories.


References
===========

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/updating-qubes-os/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-378.html
[4] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-379.html
[5] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-382.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/ Open / Comment

2021-08-25 17:59:49 QSB-070: Xen issues related to grant tables v2 and IOMMU
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/08/25/qsb-070/

We have just published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 070:
Xen issues related to grant tables v2 and IOMMU.
The text of this QSB is reproduced below. This QSB and its accompanying
signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View QSB-070 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-070-2021.txt

In addition, you may wish to:


Get the qubes-secpack: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past QSBs: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/
View the XSA Tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/




---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 070 ]===---

2021-08-25


Xen issues related to grant tables v2 and IOMMU
(XSA-378, XSA-379, XSA-382)


User action required
=====================

Users must install the following specific packages in order to address
the issues discussed in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.0, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.8.5-35

For Qubes 4.1, in dom0:
- Xen packages, version 4.14.2-2

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [1] Once available, the packages are to be installed
via the Qubes Update Tool or its command-line equivalents. [2]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
Xen binaries.


Summary
========

The following security advisories were published on 2021-08-25:

XSA-378 [3] "IOMMU page mapping issues on x86":

| Both AMD and Intel allow ACPI tables to specify regions of memory
| which should be left untranslated, which typically means these
| addresses should pass the translation phase unaltered. While these
| are typically device specific ACPI properties, they can also be
| specified to apply to a range of devices, or even all devices.
|
| On all systems with such regions Xen failed to prevent guests from
| undoing/replacing such mappings (CVE-2021-28694).
|
| On AMD systems, where a discontinuous range is specified by firmware,
| the supposedly-excluded middle range will also be identity-mapped
| (CVE-2021-28695).
|
| Further, on AMD systems, upon de-assigment of a physical device from a
| guest, the identity mappings would be left in place, allowing a guest
| continued access to ranges of memory which it shouldn't have access to
| anymore (CVE-2021-28696).
|

XSA-379 [4] "grant table v2 status pages may remain accessible after
de-allocation":

| Guest get permitted access to certain Xen-owned pages of memory. The
| majority of such pages remain allocated / associated with a guest for
| its entire lifetime. Grant table v2 status pages, however, get
| de-allocated when a guest switched (back) from v2 to v1. The freeing
| of such pages requires that the hypervisor know where in the guest
| these pages were mapped. The hypervisor tracks only one use within
| guest space, but racing requests from the guest to insert mappings of
| these pages may result in any of them to become mapped in multiple
| locations. Upon switching back from v2 to v1, the guest would then
| retain access to a page that was freed and perhaps re-used for other
| purposes.
|
| A malicious guest may be able to elevate its privileges to that of the
| host, cause host or guest Denial of Service (DoS), or cause information
| leaks.

XSA-382 [5] "inadequate grant-v2 status frames array bounds check"
| The v2 grant table interface separates grant attributes from grant
| status. That is, when operating in this mode, a guest has two tables.
| As a result, guests also need to be able to retrieve the addresses that Open / Comment

2021-08-25 17:58:49 XSAs released on 2021-08-25
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/08/25/xsas-released-on-2021-08-25/

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen Security Advisories (XSAs).
The security of Qubes OS is affected by one or more of these XSAs.
Therefore, user action is required.

XSAs that affect the security of Qubes OS (user action required)

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


XSA-378
XSA-379
XSA-382


Please see QSB-070 for the actions users must take in order to
protect themselves, as well as further details about these XSAs:

https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2021/08/25/qsb-070/

XSAs that do not affect the security of Qubes OS (no user action required)

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-380 (denial of service only)
XSA-383 (affects only Arm systems)


Related links


Xen Project XSA list: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/
Qubes XSA tracker: https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/
Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
Qubes security bulletins (QSBs): https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/ Open / Comment

2021-08-17 23:08:17 Xen Developer and Design Summit: A Year of Fuzzing with Xen
https://xenproject.org/2021/08/17/fuzzing-with-xen/

At the 2021 Xen Developer and Design Summit, Tamas K Lengyel, Senior Security Researcher at Intel Corporation, gave a deep dive into the latest developments of Intel’s Xen-based fuzzer that... Open / Comment

2021-08-03 21:10:56 In 20 minutes:

Open / Comment

2021-07-30 03:47:47 reverted to a known safe state; locally or remotely, applying changes only.
This talk will be a deep dive into the possibilities of wyng-backups for
deploying and maintaining up to date, revertible states of Qubes OS base
systems.

“SRTM and Secure Boot for VMs” by Piotr Król

This talk is the continuation of the Qubes OS mini-summit presentation “SRTM
for Qubes OS VMs”, where the theoretical background of the Static Root of Trust
was presented and discussed. In this presentation, we will practically approach
SRTM and Secure Boot for VMs. We will also explore potential use cases for
self-decrypting storage and signed kernels using safeboot. Finally, we will
discuss how to introduce this and other security mechanisms in Qubes OS.

“Usability Within A Reasonably Secure, Multi-Environment System” by Nina Alter

Nina Alter first became aware of exciting possibilities of Qubes OS, when asked
to lead UX research and design for the SecureDrop Workstation project.
SecureDrop’s Workstation is built atop Qubes OS, yet exists for high-risk,
non-technical journalist users. Nina will share her early discovery work;
the joys, the pain-points, and the many opportunities she has since uncovered
to extend Qubes OS’ reach to some of our world’s most vulnerable digital
citizens.

“Qubes OS Native App Menu: UX Design and Implementation” by Marta Marczykowska-Górecka and Nina Alter

A brief overview of the new Application Menu that’s being introduced in (at
latest) Qubes 4.2, the process of creating it, and design and implementation
challenges. Based on design work by Nina Alter and implementation by Marta
Marczykowska-Górecka.

“A brief history of USB camera support in Qubes OS” by Piotr Król

The use of complex multi-endpoint isochronous USB devices in the presence of
sys-usb was not always possible in Qubes OS. Luckily, the Qubes Video Companion
project was created by Elliot Killick, which enabled users to use USB cameras
on Qubes OS. The project is still in development and testing, but it is very
promising and gives many USB camera users hope. This presentation will tell the
story of using Qubes Video Companion with the Logitech C922.

“How to set up BTC and XMR cold storage in Qubes OS” by Piotr Król

Cold storage, also called offline wallets, provides the highest level of
security for cryptocurrency. The critical characteristic of a computing
environment that can be used as cold storage is the lack of network
connectivity. Good examples of cold storage are spare computer devices or
microcontroller-based devices like a hardware wallet. By leveraging the same
architecture, Qubes OS domains can be used for cold storage. In such a case,
one of the domains is disconnected from the network and runs a cryptocurrency
wallet inside. Other domains may generate transactions files, which are sent to
cold storage VM for signing. Signed transaction files are sent back to the
online environment. All operations are performed using well-specified and
secure Qubes RPCs. This presentation will show how to set up and use BTC and
XMR cold storage with the most popular wallets for those cryptocurrencies. We
will also discuss what other measures can be taken to secure offline wallet
VMs. Open / Comment