2023-06-13 23:33:38
While I find the mad musings of Obraz Budushego above merely mildly amusing, I will point this out: In the face of the general failure of the Ukrainian counteroink to date, Zelensky will, indeed, try something new in the second half of June, toward the end of the month. It is likely that a new front in this offensive will be opened.
I am referring, of course, to the clearly suicidal, but for that reason somehow all the more attractive to the Kiev regime, attack across the Dnepr river.
As you may have noted, the basin of the Kakhovskoye Reservoir is drying out. The river itself is turning to a narrow stream along its bed from the Dnepro HPP to nearly the estuary.
This was effected by Kiev by first discharging massive amounts of water from the Dnepro HPP during the period of the Kakhovskaya HPP collapse and then cutting off nearly the entire flow.
Either the Kiev regime was trying to prevent the collapse of the HPP system upstream (the dams have been damaged throughout and are in some danger of domino failure)—which I find unlikely—or, more likely, this was consciously done to lay the foundation for an attack across the Dnepr.
With the river turning to a relatively narrow stream, the pontoon bridges supplied over the past half a year by the West could be used in an attempt to rapidly deploy troops and establish bridgeheads, with the intention of broadly striking at the Kherson flank of the Russian grouping in Zaporozhye.
Nonetheless, I call this plan suicidal—and for a good reason. Kiev's plan likely counted on the Russian minefields and defensive lines being washed away in the deluge. Nothing of the sort has happened. Along the bank and on the islands there were observation strongholds, but the main lines of defense were originally established 20-30km inland.
Moreover, Russian troops have now returned to many positions along the left (south) bank of the Dnepr and on some islands. Critically, no artillery or mechanized units were affected by the flood.
What Ukraine's plan (if such exists) to attack across the Dnepr would involve is rolling through kilometres of flat, swampy terrain on both banks of the reduced river, erecting pontoon bridges across the Dnepr, and being in full view of the Russian artillery, air force, and the mechanized units. Fish in a barrel have it better.
This, of course, requires that the Russian Army be not too distracted by what is happening along the border (Kursk, Belgorod), on the Kupyansk or Svatovo directions, near Bakhmut and Donetsk, the Vremev Salient and elsewhere along the Zaporozhye front, and near Uglegorsk.
The men must stand strong and hold the defensive lines. Reserves must be kept back for quick maneuvering to where they are most needed (including to Kherson, should the need arise).
Provided the accurate and careful defensive operations demonstrated by the Russian Army thus far continue as they have, any Dnepr attack will, in my opinion, be suicidal for the Ukrainians. Just the thing they are wont to do.
Join Slavyangrad chat. Your opinion matters.
https://t.me/+B6ixfOM5VkxhODQx
@Slavyangrad
Join SLG Intelligence Briefings, Strategy and Analysis, Expert Community
3.2K viewsGleb Bazov, edited 20:33
S
